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Diversification, Coordination Costs and Organizational Rigidity:
Evidence from Microdata

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of coordination costs and organizational
rigidity on the returns to diversification. The central thesis is that coordination costs
offset economies of scope, while organizational rigidity increases coordination costs,
further constraining economies of scope. The empirical tests of this proposition identify
the effects of coordination and organizational rigidity costs on business-unit and firm
productivity, using novel data from the Economic Census on taxi and limousine firms.
The key results show that coordination and organizational rigidity costs are economically
and statistically significant, while organizational rigidity itself accounts for a 16%
decrease in paid ride-miles per taxicab in incumbent diversifiers, controlling for the other
costs and benefits of diversification and incumbency. The findings suggest that
coordination costs, in general, and organizational rigidity costs, in particular, limit the
scope of the firm.
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Introduction

When firms diversify into new business segments, economies of scope are achieved by
coordinating production decisions across new and legacy business units (Teece 1980,
1982). While there may be aggregate benefits of coordination, coordination is not
costless. Resources that were optimized ex ante, with respect to maximizing business
unit performance, may be underutilized ex post, as business-unit decisions are sublimated
to serve the greater good of the overall firm. Moreover, coordination is achieved by
modifying contractual structures and routines (Williamson, 1999; Nelson and Winter,
1982). To the extent that organizational change is not frictionless, organizational rigidity
increases the coordination costs of diversification and constrains economies of scope by
creating a barrier to adaptation. Consistent with the prior literature, the paper defines
coordination costs as costs that arise from managing task interdependencies (Jones and
Hill, 1987; Gulati and Singh, 1998) and organizational rigidity as the cost of
reformulating (or failing to reformulate) previously institutionalized routines and
practices in legacy businesses (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Kaplan and Henderson, 2005).
While understanding how firms respond organizationally to the challenges of
diversification is of great importance, there has been little emphasis on coordination and
organizational rigidity costs in the diversification literature, perhaps because of the
difficulty scholars face distinguishing between different types of diversification costs.

The paper develops and tests two propositions: first, that coordination costs act as an
offset to economies of scope for diversifiers, particularly in related diversification when
3

achieving synergies depends upon coordinating activities across divisions; and second,
that organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, further constraining economies
of scope, because institutionalized organizational routines and practices are costly to
change. The propositions are tested using a unique data set, consisting of detailed
establishment-level observations on every major taxicab and limousine fleet in the United
States, for the years 1992 and 1997, from the Economic Census. Taxicabs offer an
industrial context that is particularly well-suited for analysis of coordination costs and
organizational rigidity, as the taxi segment of the ground passenger transportation
industry is comprised of thousands of firms producing roughly homogenous outputs in
hundreds of heterogeneous geographically isolated markets. The homogenous nature of
production in the taxi industry allows for the creation of an economically meaningful
comparative measure of firm performance, while exogenous variation in local markets
identifies the impact of diversification on productivity.

The empirical tests identify the productivity effects of coordination and organizational
rigidity costs, in the context of related diversification. Although the organizational
rigidity analysis does not distinguish between the direct costs of adapting existing
organizational systems and the foregone efficiency costs of failing to adapt following
diversification, the paper estimates the cumulative effect of the costs of organizational
rigidity, associated with diversification. The results show that both coordination costs
and organizational rigidity costs, net of other costs and benefits of diversification and
incumbency, are economically and statistically significant, with organizational rigidity
itself accounting for a 16% decrease in paid ride-miles per taxi in incumbent diversifiers.
4

The paper makes two distinct contributions to the literature. First, it fills a gap in the
diversification literature by empirically testing for the existence of coordination costs as
an offset to economies of scope. Second, the paper takes a step toward integrating the
insights of the organizational rigidity literature with the literature on firm scope by
developing and testing a theory of how organizational rigidity influences the returns to
diversification.

Theory and related literature

Since Rumelt (1974), the strategy literature has emphasized synergies that arise from
related diversification. Synergies, or economies of scope, are, by definition, benefits that
firms achieve through coordinating production across business units that cannot be
achieved when production is optimized independently within business units (Teece, 1980,
1982). While synergy results from coordination, achieving synergy comes at the cost of
implementing and maintaining coordinated production (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). Thus,
realized economies of scope associated with diversification are equal to potential
economies of scope less the costs of implementing new coordination procedures.

Coordination costs are costs that arise from organizational interdependencies (Jones and
Hill, 1987). While in theory the costs of organizational interdependency might include
all of the costs of diversification, the literature on the costs of diversification typically
focus on corporate-level agency costs. For example, corporate managers may diversify
5

the firm to protect their jobs (Amihud and Lev, 1981), to increase the value of their skills
to the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991), or to build empires (Jensen, 1986). Agency costs
may also arise between corporate managers and operating managers in diversifying firms
because corporate managers‟ efficient span of control is limited by their ability to
adequately monitor the activities of diverse business units (Penrose, 1959; Schoar 2002).
Internal capital markets represent one important mechanism by which corporate
managers can destroy value, either because they are poorly informed about operating
units or because managers engage in ill-advised corporate “socialism” (Lamont, 1997;
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Similarly, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) discuss how
influence costs arise in diversified firms when operating units lobby the corporate center
for corporate largess.

While the literature on the costs of diversification delivers a number of important
insights, costs are usually conceptualized as value destroying mistakes made by corporate
managers.

Thus, the main theoretical thrust of the literature on the costs of

diversification has been about the efficiency of the corporate center following
diversification, and the main question the empirical literature on the costs of the
diversification has grappled with is whether diversification destroys value (Wernerfeldt
and Montgomery, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Campa and
Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004).

This paper takes a different approach. Rather than focusing on corporate-level agency
costs, the paper considers the impact of coordination costs on the firm‟s operating units,
6

following diversification. This emphasis on coordination costs builds on the insights of
the early theoretical literature on diversification, which proposes that coordination costs
are manifest at the operating unit level as a cost of substituting corporate governance for
market governance (Jones and Hill, 1988). Thus, coordination costs are conceptually
distinct from corporate-level agency costs in that they are costs of coordinating
production across business units, even when the corporate center acts in good faith,
effectively monitors its business units, provides appropriate incentives, and efficiently
allocates capital.

As in Hoskisson and Hitt (1988), this paper proposes that coordination costs should
always be non-zero unless optimizing each business unit independently also optimizes
both jointly, in which case there is no need to integrate them. Yet, if each business unit
can be optimized on a stand-alone basis, altering the organization of any business unit to
achieve coordination benefits across business units must sub-optimize the stand-alone
value of that business unit. Thus, diversification increases firm value at the cost of suboptimizing at least one business unit‟s stand-alone organization.

The theory proposed is consistent with Levinthal and Wu (2006), who conceptualize the
benefits and costs of diversification in terms of the impact of integration on capacity
constrained versus scale free resources. Synergy arises when joint production increases
utilization of scale free resources, whereas coordinated production is costly when it taxes
capacity constrained resources. In their model, net profit from sharing resources within a
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firm includes both the costs and benefits of diversification with respect to shared
resources.

While Levinthal and Wu (2006) describe conditions necessary for diversification to
create value, the coordination cost literature implies that achieving synergies from shared
resources is not a sufficient condition for determining whether diversification creates
value because diversifying firms also encounter bureaucratic costs of coordinating
resources (Jones and Hill, 1987). In Jones and Hill (1987) achieving synergies from
shared resources leads firms to reorganize, sub-optimizing the utilization of non-shared
resources by blunting operating unit incentives or imposing rules and procedures that
hinder decentralized decision making. Thus, coordination costs associated with both
shared and non-shared resources are expected to be positive, even when realized
economies of scope are positive.

The insight that non-shared activities and resources may be sub-optimized by
diversification is particularly important for understanding why diversification leads to
operating costs, even when integration primarily takes place at the corporate level.
Indeed, it is precisely the goal of pursuing potential synergies that leads to coordination
costs. The first hypothesis, therefore, predicts that related diversification in pursuit of
potential synergies leads to coordination costs that act as an offset to realized economies
of scope.

8

Hypothesis 1: In diversifying firms, coordination costs attenuate realized
economies of scope.

The first hypothesis predicts the existence of coordination costs in diversified firms. To
refine our understanding of the mechanisms underlying coordination costs the paper
builds on the insights of organizational theory, particularly the idea that routines and
contracts are costly to change once they are institutionalized, which Kaplan and
Henderson (2005) call organizational rigidity.1

The concept of organizational rigidity is closely related to Leonard-Barton‟s (1992)
proposition that the very routines that create competitive advantage in firms are
vulnerable to becoming “core rigidities”, or sources of competitive disadvantage, when
firms confront environmental changes. Tushman and Anderson (1986) discuss a similar
phenomenon in their research on the impact of technological discontinuities on firm
performance. They find that competency destroying technological change render existing
techniques obsolete, forcing firms to undergo a costly process by which they acquire new
skills, ability and knowledge. Henderson and Clark (1990) build on this insight to
propose that certain kinds of technological change can destroy organizational capital
accumulated in incumbents, allowing start-ups to outperform them. This paper builds on
and extends the prior conceptions of organizational rigidity by including foregone
1

The paper focuses on organizational rigidity, as opposed to organizational inertia or structural inertia, a
concept frequently used to study population-level organizational change (Hannan and Freeman; 1977,
1984). While organizational rigidity and organizational inertia are related concepts, in that they both make
predictions about organizational adaptation costs, the former applies to rational choices firms make as they
trade off coordination costs and economies of scope, while the latter applies best to population-level
selection effects and does not make a clear prediction about how diversification influences the operations of
the firm (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991).
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productivity opportunities as well as the costs associated with renegotiating contracts.
The paper also extends the implications of rigid organizations beyond contexts where
there are exogenous technological discontinuities, positing that organizational rigidity is a
common friction faced by all incumbent firms contemplating organization changes, and
of particular importance when firms pursue synergies through coordination.

In the context of diversification, organizational rigidity can be seen as an additional cost
of pursuing potential economies of scope, further limiting realized economies of scope
associated with horizontal integration. Figure 1 shows how the concept of organizational
rigidity adds a new dimension to extant models of coordination costs by illustrating the
relationships between diversification, economies of scope (potential and realized),
coordination costs, and organizational rigidity.

******************************
****FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE****
******************************

When firms diversify, they reorganize their operating units to create value by altering
existing routines and contracts.

A theory of organizational rigidity predicts that

reorganization is costly, in the sense that it destroys tacit knowledge embedded in
existing processes, leads to incentive problems when contracts are re-negotiated, and
creates frictions that lead to foregone productivity opportunities. For example, more rigid
firms will allow higher levels of cannibalization and will engage in less cross-selling to
10

avoid a more extensive overhaul of their legacy operations. In the language of Levinthal
and Wu (2006), organizational rigidity increases coordination costs associated with nonshared resources reducing the benefits of resource sharing. This insight leads directly to
the second hypothesis: organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, taxing the
productivity of diversifying firms through direct adaptation costs and indirect costs of
foregone opportunities.

Hypothesis 2: Organizational rigidity increases coordination costs
reducing realized economies of scope.

The second hypothesis predicts that coordination costs are increasing in organizational
rigidity, while economies of scope are decreasing in organizational rigidity. While past
work has focused on the costs of structuring new activities and cross-unit
interconnections to capture new synergies (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987; Jones and Hill,
1988), this paper examines organizational rigidities – the costs of changing (or not
changing) previously institutionalized routines and practices in legacy businesses. Since
existing organizations are, by definition, more rigid than start-up organizations,
organizational rigidity costs are particular to incumbent firms, while coordination costs
are common to all diversified firms. The key testable implication of organizational
rigidity, in the context of diversification, is, therefore, that the productivity advantage
focused incumbents typically have over focused start-ups will shrink when both
incumbents and start-ups are diversified.
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By considering how organizational change associated with diversification influences
competition between start-ups (de novo entrants) and diversifying incumbents, the paper
builds on and extends a nascent body of research, which may be called the de novo and
de alio (lateral) entry literature. Carroll, Bigelow, Sidel, and Tsai (1996) and Khessina
and Carroll (2001) present evidence that lateral entrants – firms that enter a new business
from within an industry – tend to survive longer than start-ups in scale intensive
industries. In related work, Klepper and Simons (2000) compare different types of lateral
entrants into the television manufacturing industry and find that pre-entry experience
facilitates different levels of knowledge spillovers in R&D. This paper builds on the de
novo and de alio literature by explicitly considering how entry status influences the
returns to diversification. While the de novo and de alio literature typically focuses on
firm survival in the new business as the key outcome variable, this paper focuses on
business unit productivity as the key measure of firm performance. Diversified firms
may outlast focused firms because they have deep pockets or less variable cash flows,
reasons unrelated to productivity. Thus, the finding that diversification leads to falling
productivity is complementary to the de novo and de alio literature, suggesting that
economies of scope also play a role in determining competitive advantage in the
competition between de novo and de alio entrants.

Institutional Background

The taxicab segment of the ground passenger transportation industry (hereafter the
“taxicab industry”) is particularly well-suited for studying the productivity consequences
12

of coordination costs and organizational rigidity, in the context of diversification. One
attractive feature of the taxicab industry is that it is a local business with regulated prices.
Since taxi markets are geographically segmented, the nationwide taxicab industry is
actually a collection of hundreds of independent city-level markets, providing
considerable variation to identify the effects of interest. I exploit the fact that firms face
regulated prices, in their local markets, to develop a precise and economically meaningful
measure of firm performance that can be interpreted as physical output per unit of input.
Furthermore, the level of horizontal integration between taxis and limousines changed
dramatically during the sample period due to widespread regulatory changes, creating a
quasi-natural experiment in lateral diversification.2

Prior to the 1990s taxicab and black car operations were strictly legally separated by local
regulation. Following the high-profile “Freedom Cab” case (Jones v. Temmer) in
Colorado in 1993, which was not directly related to cross-ownership, state legislatures
became increasingly involved in mitigating these conflicts by passing laws wresting
regulatory authority over limousines from local regulators (Cox, 1993). As regulatory
limitations on cross ownership were removed private-for-hire fleets began to operate both
taxicabs and limousines.

The logic behind expanding from taxicab into limousine services is straightforward.
Limousine services represent a higher priced, differentiated service, produced in a

2

For so freely sharing the wealth of knowledge they have accumulated regarding the U.S. taxicab industry,
I am indebted to: C.J. Christina, Jason Diaz, Thomas Drischler, John Hamilton, Stan Faulwetter, Alfred La
Gasse, Kimberly Lewis, Joe Morra; Marco Henry, John Perry, David Reno, Aubby Sherman, Doug
Summers, and especially Craig Leisy.
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manner that is qualitatively similar to taxicab services. For example, fleets recruit
drivers, acquire vehicles and permits, match drivers to cars as well as schedule and
deliver rides to passengers. Multidivisional (e.g., taxi and limousine) fleets attempt to
spread their fixed costs, in each of these functions, across the boundaries of the taxi and
limousine businesses. Taxi firms also report that they up-sell taxi customers to
limousines where possible, employing limousines to meet unmet taxi demand during
peak times to smooth overall capacity utilization.

Taken together, the advantages of integration can be substantial. However, taxi fleet
operators also describe several coordination-related costs of operating both taxicabs and
limousines, in the same fleet. Firms face capacity utilization challenges immediately
following diversification. Implementing new contracts and monitoring systems often
frustrates existing drivers, leading to defections. Diversifying firms often face customer
defections as well, particularly when customers are required to participate in new
protocols, such as administering vouchers to employees. Moreover, managing two types
of drivers, vehicles, incentive schemes and customers can create complexity that is
difficult to manage. For example, taxi managers observed that, following diversification,
they spent more time on recruiting independent drivers and customer relationship
management issues, managerial challenges not faced by taxi fleet operators that focus on
transactional spot-market exchange.
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In addition, variation in incentive schemes3 can lead to coordination failures, particularly
channel conflict when taxi drivers refuse to cede lucrative rides to limousines, and
decreased utilization of taxicabs (cannibalization), as fleets steer higher value rides
toward limousines. While cannibalization directly offsets the gross benefits of up-selling,
steering can also lead to more pernicious outcomes, as taxi drivers subvert the
dispatching system by picking up fares intended for limousines, thereby creating chaos in
the dispatching system.

Firms may respond to internal conflicts by keeping their dispatching processes separate,
but this also reduces the benefits of integration. Rather than maintaining separate
dispatching operations, diversifiers tend to change their contracting practices, with
respect to asset ownership, to manage cannibalization, contracting more extensively with
professional independent drivers who are better able to operate in a more complex
dispatching environment.4 Organizational changes at diversifying taxi firms are
illustrative of the broader set of issues diversifying firms face. Diversifiers choose
between capturing operational synergies, by adapting organizationally and closely
coordinating the operations of different business units, and avoiding the coordination
costs of diversification, by keeping businesses separate.

There appear to be significant coordination costs as well as benefits from operating an
integrated taxi and limousine firm. The key question, with respect to the second
3

Firms face an important moral hazard problem because they cannot monitor taxi driver effort. The nearubiquitous solution is for taxi drivers to be compensated with high-powered incentives. By contrast,
monitoring is much easier in the black car business, since most rides are dispatched. Therefore, black car
drivers often are compensated with lower-powered incentives.
4
These results are available from the author upon request.
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hypothesis, predicting that organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, is whether
incumbent firms can shift to the new organizational optimum costlessly or whether their
existing contracts and routines constrain their ability to adapt relative to a diversified
start-up. Anecdotally, firms report diversification-related costs that stem from
organizational adaptations: retraining dispatchers, re-contracting with drivers and
renegotiating with clients. If coordination costs and organizational rigidity are not only
salient, but also economically meaningful, we should see their effects on business unit
and firm productivity. To formally test for coordination costs and organizational
rigidities in the production function, the paper turns to the data.

Data and Measures

The core dataset for this paper comes from the 1992 and 1997 Economic Census. The
Economic Census includes every taxi and limousine firm in the United States with at
least one employee (SIC code 412100 [taxicabs] and 411920 [limousines]). The
comprehensiveness of the database is extremely useful as it allows us to track every
incumbent firm with at least one employee over time and to observe every new and
lateral entrant into the taxi and limousine market in 1997. The database contains detailed
establishment-level data on firm revenue, line of business revenue at the six-digit
industry level, number of vehicles by type (e.g., taxi vs. limousine) and geographic
identifiers.5

5

Less than 1% of establishments were in firms that had multiple locations. Using an alternative sample
that excluded multi-establishment firms had no effect on the results.
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The 1992 and 1997 Economic Census contain complete records on 1,020 and 1,106
observations, respectively; on taxi firms with at least two taxicabs; $10,000 of taxi
revenue; and, at least, two taxi fleets in their market (county).6 I use all of the complete
observations for computing total factor productivity and for cross-sectional tests of the
impact of diversification and entry status on productivity.7 The cross-sectional samples
consist of approximately 30% of all taxi firms (with at least one employee) and between
50-65% of the $1 billion taxicab industry. For tests of the impact of diversification on
within-firm business-unit-specific asset utilization, I use the subset of firms that existed
and reported complete data in both 1992 and 1997 (n=560). The within-firm changes
sample includes approximately half the firms and about 70% of revenue in the cross
sectional regressions.

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for both the cross-sectional data sets and the
within-firm changes set. Table 1 reveals that in 1992, 99% of taxi firms were single
product firms. By 1997, 62% of taxi firms also operated limousines (40% are
incumbents while 22% are start-ups). I define lateral diversifiers from taxicab to
limousine operations as those firms that had SIC code 412100 and no limousines in their
fleet in 1992, but had at least one limousine in their fleet by 1997.8

6

Approximately 2,000 observations, in 1992 and 1997, are not used because they do not contain the
number of taxicabs in their fleet. This set is primarily composed of administrative record (AR)
observations – very small firms that the Economic Census does not actually survey but rather imputes
values for. Using alternative samples, with more or less stringent sample restrictions, led to the same
qualitative findings.
7
Firms that existed in 1992, but were small or reported incomplete data, are properly treated as incumbents
(rather than start-ups) in 1997 cross sectional regressions.
8
Alternative measures of lateral entry, including measures that required taxi firms to have a certain fraction
(e.g., 10%) of their vehicle capital in limousines or attain a certain percentage (e.g., 10%) of their revenue
in limousines were very highly correlated with the “single limousine” measure of lateral entry and yielded
qualitatively identical results.
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Empirical tests on taxicab performance, which is defined in terms of productivity as in
Hill and Snell (1989), are facilitated by the relatively simple and homogenous production
function in the taxicab industry, which minimizes measurement error in the key reducedform establishment-level productivity measures I employ. I define the profit function in
the usual way with two parameters that link profitability and productivity to the firm‟s
entry and diversification status. Profit π for an input and output price-taking firm i, in
business-unit j = {Taxi, Limousine}, and geographic market m, which can be represented
by:

(1) πi = (pTm-cTm)YiT(θ,ζ) + (pBm-cBm)YiB(θ,ζ) - F(Ki,ζ),
Yj = Aij(θ,ζ)KijβkLijβl,

where Y is output in units (ride-mile equivalents or “rides” assuming miles per ride are
approximately constant across vehicles within a market), subscripts T and B index taxicab
and limousine operations; F>0 is the fixed cost of operations, where fixed costs are
increasing in total capital (K) and scope (ζ). The market price per ride p>0 and the cost
of selling an additional ride c>0 convert physical output into gross profit, where physical
output Y is generated by a production function that transforms inputs capital (K) and
labor (L) using technology (A), which can be interpreted as total factor productivity in
quantities (TFPQ).9 The two key parameters θ = {0,1} and ζ = {0,1} index whether the

9

Since the taxi and limousine industry production function is approximately Leontief, the labor term is
dropped in the final specification (equation (2)) below.
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firm is an incumbent or start-up, and whether the firm is diversified or focused,
respectively.

It is clear from equation (1) that potential fixed cost savings play an important role in
determining firm strategy with respect to economies of scope. Therefore, caution must
be used when interpreting differences in productivity as differences in profitability. The
key assumption required to connect productivity to profitability is that fixed costs are
independent of entry status θ, as is evident in equation (1).10

When market prices are fixed and labor is used proportionately to capital, as in the taxi
market, total factor productivity in quantities (TFPQ)11 can be computed for a focused
establishment i, at time t is as the residual of a regression12 of a time-specific intercept α,
a market-level fixed effect λ, and the log of establishment-specific capital k, on the log of
dollar denominated revenue r as in:

(2) rit = αt + λmt+ βtkit + TFPQit .

The key feature of (2) is that TFPQ can be interpreted as a measure of physical asset
utilization relative to other fleets in the same market that is standardized to have mean

10

Additionally, to calculate the impact of differences in productivity on differences in profit, holding fixed
costs constant, productivity also has to be scaled by gross margin = (p-c)/p.
11
See Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) for a detailed derivation of TFPQ
12
As in Solow (1957) total factor productivity is estimated as the residual from a production function.
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zero within market (county).13 To calculate pooled (taxi and limousine) productivity, r is
log pooled revenue and k is log pooled capital.14

Specification

Changes in taxi productivity following diversification into limousines

The baseline test measures the effect of diversification on within-firm changes in taxi
productivity. I implement this test by taking differences in productivity, at the firm level
from 1992 and 1997, to eliminate unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics that
influence productivity and using (3):

(3) ΔTFPQi = B0 + •B1ΔSTATUSi + Xc,iBc + ei,

where ΔTFPQ is the change in taxicab productivity as defined above and ΔSTATUS is a
categorical variable that captures whether the firm diversified during the sample period.
Xc,i is a vector of controls that could plausibly shift the supply or demand structure of the
local taxicab market including: legal form of organization15; size; changes in local
market population; changes in the number of taxis in the market; changes in the number
of limousines in the market; and e is an error term. Since taxicab capital under
13

TFPQ is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, though doing so has no impact on the results.
The pooled calculation can only be interpreted as total factor productivity (TFP) since limousine prices
are not regulated at the local level. While TFPQ is ideal, TFP delivers a useful, if imperfect, measure of
multi-factor productivity.
15
Legal form of organization is defined as the firm‟s tax status as reported to the IRS, which is coded as a
categorical variable equal to one if the firm is a corporation and zero otherwise. Alternative specifications
that used a vector of legal forms of organization, including corporation, partnership, sole-proprietorship and
co-operative had no effect of the results.
14
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management is included as a continuous variable in the first stage of the total factor
productivity calculation, size is included non-parametrically in the second stage, using
the intuitive, which correspond to each 1/3 of the size distribution. The results are robust
to alternative measures of size and to specifications that include firm-level fixed effects,
rather than computing changes in firm characteristics directly.16

Identification strategy

The key factor identifying the tests of the first hypothesis, which predicts coordination
costs offset (realized) economies of scope, is that market-level characteristics
exogenously influence the firm‟s decision to diversify. In the ideal experiment, we
would randomly assign the “treatment” diversification, and factors of production, and
observe how productivity changed in the treatment group compared to a control group.
Measuring within-firm changes in productivity, in the presence of a regulatory shock,
reduces the need for an alternative identification strategy. However, one cannot be
certain that there are not time-varying firm-specific shocks that are correlated with
diversification and the outcome variables of interest. In particular, we might be
concerned that firms diversify after being exposed to negative productivity shock.
Diversifying in response to unobserved negative productivity shocks is a threat to causal
inference because an exogenous shock to firm strategy sets (e.g., the regulatory change)
does not prevent endogenous firm choice from biasing OLS estimates.

16

Because there are only two time periods I compute differences at the firm-level to eliminate the effect of
time invariant unobserved firm specific characteristics rather than using firm fixed effects.
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I address endogeneity issues using lagged (e.g., 1992) concentration of limousines in the
firm‟s market as an instrumental variable (IV) for the entry decision. Lagged
concentration of limousines in the firm‟s market is a good instrument for horizontal entry,
since incumbent firms will be more interested in entering the limousine market when it is
not dominated by a major player. When a few major players dominate a market, it is
usually because they have developed deep relationships in the lucrative corporate market
for limousine service (Taxi, Limousine and Paratransit Association Fact Book:
Limousine and Sedan Division, 2004). High limousine concentration also represents an
entry barrier because concentrated competition increases the threat of retaliation.17
Furthermore, lagged market concentration of limousines should not affect changes in any
given firm‟s productivity levels (relative to other firms in the same market). Results are
robust to alternative instruments that proxy for the degree of competition in the local
limousine market and to correcting for selection effects based on all observable
characteristics of firms using propensity score matching.

Diversification and the costs of organizational rigidity

Estimating the impact of diversification and entry status on the costs of organizational
rigidity in cross-section requires some additional assumptions. The key identifying
assumption is that fixed costs are independent of entry status conditional on firm scope.
The fixed cost assumption seems reasonable given the nature of the industry as fixed

17

Retaliation could be economic or physical. A number of sources have noted the connection between the
ground passenger transportation industry and organized crime, making the threat of physical conflict a very
real consideration in the industry. Celona (2004a and 2004b) reports explicit connections between
organized crime and intimidation of limo drivers.
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costs are typically facilities, dispatching systems and back-office labor, which should not
differ between start-ups and incumbents conditional on the scope of the operation. I
formulate the connection between total factor productivity and the costs of organizational
rigidity more formally in the appendix section B.

To test the second hypothesis that the productivity gap between incumbents and start-ups
will shrink, when both incumbents and start-ups are diversified, I use (4):

(4) TFPi = β0 + STATUSi•βS + Xc,iβc + εi,

where subscript t is suppressed because the cross-sectional tests are all performed in1997,
TFP is multifactor productivity in the pooled (taxi and limo) regressions and total factor
productivity in quantities (TFPQ) in the taxi-only regressions, STATUS is a vector of
dummies that capture the interaction between entry status and firm scope (e.g., single
product incumbent, lateral diversifier, taxi-only start-up, diversified entrant). Xc,it is a
vector controls as above, except that the controls are in levels rather than in changes, and
ε is an error term.

Taking differences d1 in the coefficients that measure the relative productivity of single
product start-ups and single product incumbents, [d1 = (βs | taxi-only start-up) - (βs | taxionly incumbents)] establishes the net incumbency advantage. I then use the difference d2
in the coefficients that measure the relative productivity of taxi and limo start-ups and
lateral diversifiers, [d2 = (βs | taxi and limo start-ups) - (βs | lateral diversifiers)], to
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establish the combined effect of a change in scope and the advantages of incumbency.
The difference in these two differences, C(δ) = d1 - d2, recovers the net cost of
organizational rigidity – the main test of the second hypothesis. While the empirical tests
described identify organizational rigidity costs by comparing diversified incumbents
against diversified start-ups, the existence of the latter is only a convenient empirical
device. Conceptually, organizational rigidity costs should always act as a barrier to
adaptation in the context of diversification.

Results and Discussion

Diversification and coordination costs

Figure 2 shows the kernel density distributions of taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ)
for future diversifiers and non-diversifiers in 1992 and diversifiers and non-diversifiers in
1997. Visually diversification appears to have a significant effect on the relative
productivity of diversified firms‟ taxis. More formally, Table 2 estimates of the impact
of diversification on taxi utilization. Column (1a) shows that lateral entry into the
limousine business is correlated with a within-firm change in taxicab productivity of 0.45 (-36%) and is significant at the 1% level.18

The inclusion of a number of exogenous firm and market level controls reduces the point
estimate to -0.41 (-34%) without affecting the statistical significance of the result

18

The percentage change in productivity is computed from the coefficient estimate on diversification
according to 1- exp(B1), for B1<0.
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(column 2a). Changes in the competitive dimensions of the market, e.g., the number of
taxicabs and limousines operated by other fleets, do not have much influence on the costs
of lateral expansion because differencing total factor productivity, at the market level,
leaves little variation to be explained by changes in these variables. The coefficient on
changes in taxi ownership rates in other fleets is positive and significant because permit
prices are correlated with expected positive future productivity shocks. When permit
prices rise, drivers are more likely to face wealth constraints, limiting independent
ownership of taxicabs. However, the economic magnitude of the effect is small at 5%
(0.20 x 0.27) in the average market.

******************************
****FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE****
******************************

Since the decision to diversify laterally is endogenous, the OLS results discussed above
can only be interpreted as correlations. To control for the endogeneity of the lateral entry
strategy with the change in productivity, I use the lagged level of concentration of
limousines (L-HHI) in the firm‟s market as an instrument for lateral entry, where L-HHI
is expected to be strongly negatively correlated with lateral entry. Column (1b) shows
2SLS estimates of the effect of diversification on changes in productivity. The first-stage
results are strong (F-statistic of 32) and in the direction expected, indicating that the
instrument is powerful and operating as predicted (see 1SLS summary statistics at the
bottom of column 1b). The point estimate on diversification in the univariate 2SLS
25

specification is -0.53 (-41%) and is significant at the 1% level. The results are
qualitatively unchanged with controls (column 2b). The interpretation is that there is a
causal relationship between lateral entry and changes in core taxicab business-unit
productivity.

The results support the contention of the first hypothesis, which predicts the existence of
coordination costs at the operating division level, but are incomplete with respect to
organizational rigidity costs. To test the second hypothesis, I turn to cross-sectional
evidence.

Diversification and organizational rigidity

Figure 3 shows the kernel density plots of the cross-section of taxi-only productivity for
the four types of firms in the sample {taxi-only incumbents, incumbent diversifiers, taxionly start-ups, and diversified start-ups}. It is clear from the figure that the productivity
advantage of incumbency is smaller for diversified firms than for focused taxi firms.
Table 3 shows this result formally. The key result in Table 3 is the estimate of the cost of
organizational rigidity C(δ), which is derived from the relative productivity estimates of
the four types of firms in the sample (see the appendix section B for the explicit
formulation of the relationship between productivity and the costs of organizational
rigidity). Overall, pooled (taxi and limo) performance is examined as a robustness check
to understand whether the taxi-only productivity effect of diversification can be explained
by differences in productivity in limousines between start-ups and incumbents.
26

******************************
****FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE****
******************************

As in the within-firm regressions, the results of the cross-sectional regressions show large
economic and statistical effects of diversification on productivity. The table also shows a
pattern consistent with the assumption that start-ups are generally disadvantaged
compared to incumbent firms. The main cross-sectional productivity results are
presented in columns 1 and 2, using the taxi-only production characteristics and the taxionly subset. Column 1 shows the results without controls, where the excluded category is
incumbent firms who did not expand into limousines. The TFPQ of start-up taxi fleet is
0.23 below the mean of incumbent firms, while taxi to limo diversifiers and diversified
start-ups fall 0.66 and 0.67 below TFPQ of incumbents who did not expand into
limousines. The difference in the productivity gap between focused and diversified startups and incumbents in the taxi-only case is -0.21 (-19% of TFPQ).19 Adding a number of
controls, in Table 3, for exogenous firm and market-level characteristics reduces the
coefficient estimates slightly to -0.17 (-16% of TFPQ) and the result continues to be
significant at the 5% level (column 2, bottom).20 The results provide support for
coordination costs as the mechanism acting to offset synergies, as predicted by the first
19

The difference in the productivity gap between focused and diversified start-ups and incumbents is
calculated as the difference in the coefficient estimates on STATUS, C(δ) = d1 - d2, where [d1 = (βs | taxionly start-up) - (βs | taxi-only incumbents)] and [d2 = (βs | taxi and limo start-ups) - (βs | lateral
diversifiers)]. In Table 3 column (1), d 1 = -0.23, d2 = -.01 and C(δ) = -0.21. I use STATA‟s lincom
command to calculate the standard error of C(δ), which is computed as the square-root of a weighted sum
of the squared standard errors of the coefficient estimates.
20
Total factor productivity in quantities (TFPQ) can be interpreted as changes in paid ride miles per
vehicle.
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hypothesis, since the cross-sectional tests implicitly control for agency costs as well as
economies of scope; and for the second hypothesis, which predicts that organizational
rigidity increases coordination costs and constrains economies of scope.

28

Robustness of cross-sectional tests

One potential problem with interpreting the declining taxi-only productivity gap between
incumbents and start-ups, when both are diversified, is that incumbents may be more
productive than start-ups in limousines. Indeed, if part of the measured organizational
rigidity effect reflects the superior cross-selling ability of incumbents, then lower taxi
utilization may reflect higher limousine utilization, which we may mistake as
organizational rigidity. To address this issue, I examine whether measured organizational
rigidity costs change when accounting for pooled revenues and capital stock. Table 3
column 3 shows that taxi to limo diversifiers‟ and diversified start-ups‟ multifactor
productivity is far below incumbents who do not diversify (the excluded group), while
diversified start-ups and focused (taxi only) start-ups are -0.26 (-23% of TFP) behind. In
column (3), the adjustment cost estimate is -0.26 (-23% of TFP) and significant at the 5%
level. Adding a vector of controls, in column 4, has a small effect on the estimate of
organizational adjustment costs. Although the pooled results measure TFP and not
TFPQ, and are therefore not as precise as the taxi-only estimates, they provide some
additional evidence that organizational rigidity has real economic implications.

The key identifying assumption, in the cross-sectional tests, is that start-ups decide to
diversify using the same selection process that incumbents follow. This assumption
appears to be reasonable, given the findings in the within-firm regressions and the
continued use of county-level fixed effects in the cross-sectional tests. Recall that 1992
productivity levels were almost identical for both future diversifiers and future non29

diversifiers, while the 2SLS results in Table 2 showed that the selection effect biases the
OLS productivity results toward zero. Therefore, for incumbents, we can be reasonably
confident that variation in ability (e.g., 1992 productivity) does not drive the
diversification decision and that, on average, firms that earn the highest marginal returns
from diversification choose to do so. If start-ups also choose whether to diversify based
only on how good they are at diversifying and not based on unobserved (to the
econometrician) quality differences between firms, the assumption holds, and the crosssectional results are well identified. 21

Discussion

The existence of coordination costs supports Jones and Hill‟s (1987) contention that there
are unique risks of related diversification. If achieving synergies comes at the cost of
coordinating activities between business units, related diversification can be a high-risk,
high-reward activity.

The existence of organizational rigidity costs, in the context of diversification, has
important implications for firm strategy. If organizational rigidity imposes adaptation
21

I also verify the robustness of the falling taxicab productivity following diversification result to other
plausible alternative explanations that have little to do with organizational change, including (1)
diversification causing the firm to under invest in productivity enhancing technology and (2) diversification
causing the firm to shift investments away from the taxi business toward the limousine business. With
respect to diversification and investment in technology (1), I find that diversification is indeed correlated
with lower levels of adoption of new dispatching technology, and that new dispatching technology is
associated with higher productivity for adopters. However, diversification effects swamp non-adoption
effects in regressions on changes in productivity that include both factors. With respect to shifting
investments to limousines (2), I find that diversifying firms invest almost 50% more in new taxi-specific
assets than do non-diversifiers, controlling for their size before diversification. Thus, diversifiers expand
their limousine and taxi businesses simultaneously, which is inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis
that diversifiers shift investment away from taxis. Results are available from the author upon request.
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costs on existing organizational systems then firms possessing valuable organizational
assets should be wary of pursuing strategies that rely on achieving operational synergies,
since organizational change erodes the value of the existing nexus of contracts and
routines. More fundamentally, organizational rigidity implies that competitors may be
able to achieve synergies at a lower cost, even when the focal firm is more productive.

One potential concern with the estimated organizational rigidity effect is that a decline in
paid ride miles per vehicle of 16% (see Table 3 column 2, bottom) is larger than one
might have expected a priori.22 At least two caveats are in order in interpreting the
magnitude of the estimated organizational rigidity effect. First, changes in ride miles per
vehicle do not translate directly into changes in profits per vehicle because taxis are only
being driven empty a portion of the time they are not utilized. Instead firms and drivers
take shifts off the market and/or shorten shift hours. If we re-estimated taxi capacity in
terms of taxi up-time, the utilization effect would be smaller. However, the ride-miles
per vehicle measure is still a useful measure of productivity as firms can always sell their
taxi to another firm in the same market and generate more paid ride-miles. Second, the
16% decline in paid ride miles per vehicle is not necessarily the long-run steady state
effect of diversification as diversified firms may end up selling their marginal taxis rather
than running them under-utilized. Thus, the organizational rigidity effect may attenuate
over time.

22

Although on its face 16% seems like a large effect several industry participants reported (anecdotally)
much larger declines in taxi productivity.
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Limitations

The decision to diversify depends on the associated costs and benefits, as well as the
regulatory environment, which may determine whether the choice is available. This
paper quantifies some of the costs of integration, but does not quantify all of the potential
benefits – particularly the long-run benefits. Thus, it is not surprising that we observe a
great deal of integration despite the existence of organizational rigidity costs. Future
research might extend this work by exploiting a longer time series to understand the
persistence of coordination costs and organizational rigidities.

A second important limitation to this research is that coordination costs and the costs
organizational rigidity are not observed directly, but rather are estimated by exploiting
variation in firm strategies and geographic markets. Furthermore, the analysis does not
distinguish between adaptation cost and non-adaptation cost components of
organizational rigidity. A further limitation of this paper is the inability to measure the
extent of task differentiation between business units, which is conjectured to influence
the magnitude of the organizational rigidity effects. Measuring coordination and
organizational rigidity costs directly, as well as understanding adaptation versus nonadaptation costs and exploring the relationship between task differentiation and
organizational rigidity represent opportunities for future research.

Finally, the findings of this paper are limited to a single industry and, therefore, the
results should be generalized cautiously as the magnitude and nature of organizational
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rigidities may vary extensively across industries. Nevertheless the results of this work
seem broadly applicable to industrial contexts where economies of scope are gained by
sublimating the organization of one line of business to the overall needs of the firm.23

Conclusion

This paper proposes and tests two related propositions: (1) that coordination costs, the
costs that arise from managing task interdependencies, offset economies of scope and (2)
that organizational rigidity, the costs of reorganizing legacy business unit activities,
increase coordination costs, further constraining economies of scope in diversifying
firms. Conceptually, organizational rigidity includes both costs that arise directly from
organizational adaptation and indirect costs of foregone productivity gains when adaption
is too expensive to undertake.

The paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment in diversification, using a rich and novel
micro-data set on taxi firms to test the influence of diversification on firm performance.
Within firm changes in taxi utilization is substantially negative following diversification.
Comparing the productivity of diversified and focused start-ups and incumbent firms
reveals that, controlling for the benefits of diversification, the productivity advantage
incumbents have over start-ups is reduced by 16%, when both are diversified. I interpret
23

For example, consider Starbucks‟s recent experience selling hot sandwiches at their coffee shops. The
company began selling hot sandwiches in 2004, believing that there were economies of scope inherent in
serving coffee and hot food together, but found the “scent of the warm sandwiches interferes with the
aroma of the stores that serving hot food . . . and [got in the way of employees‟] ability to make the perfect
shot of espresso” (Starbucks Press Release, 2008). While it is difficult to disentangle coordination costs
from the costs of organizational rigidity from press releases, the problems Starbucks faced with their hot
sandwich line of business are illustrative of the costs of horizontal expansion as discussed in this paper.
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these differences in productivity as evidence of coordination costs and organizational
rigidity.

The existence of coordination and organizational rigidity costs, in the context of
diversification, has implications for the study of firms as organizations more broadly. In
particular, we might expect coordination and organizational rigidity costs to act as a
brake on horizontal diversification strategies. More generally, organizational rigidities
impose a hurdle for any strategy that requires organizational change. Diversification,
vertical integration, geographical dispersion, merger activity, and reengineering decisions
are all potentially influenced by the costs organizational rigidity. Thus, organizational
rigidity helps explain the limits to firm change and growth. Moreover, the finding that
start-ups are more flexible than incumbents, in the context of diversification, suggests
that start-ups may be more flexible than incumbents, in a more general sense. While
others have argued start-ups respond more effectively than incumbents to technological
change, this paper provides evidence that start-ups are also more nimble in a broader
sense.
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Figure 1 Interrelationships between the main variables of interest
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Figure 2 Changes in the distributions of total factor productivity **
Panel A: Distribution of 1992 total factor productivity (TFPQ)
Total factor productivity conditional on future diversification status (TFPQi1992 | ζ)

Incumbents who do
not diversify in the
future (INC or ζ=0)
Density of the
TFPQ
distribution

TFPQ
This figure shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) in 1992
conditional on (future) diversification (ζ). n = 560
** See Table 2 for regression output that compares the means of this distribution with the means of the
1997 taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) distribution

Panel B: Distribution of 1997 total factor productivity (TFPQ)
Total factor productivity conditional on diversification status (TFPQi1997 | ζ)

Incumbents who do
not diversify in the
future (INC or ζ=0)

Density of the
TFPQ
distribution

TFPQ
This figure shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) in 1997
conditional on diversification (ζ). n = 560
** See Table 2 for regression output that compares the means of this distribution with the means of the
1992 taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) distribution
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Figure 3 Distributions of taxi-only total factor productivity (TFPQ) **
1997 total factor productivity conditional on diversification and entry status
(ΔTFPQi | ζ, θ)
Taxi incumbents who diversify into
limousines (ALI or ζ=1, θ=1)
Taxi-only start-ups
(NOV1 or ζ=0, θ=0)

Diversified start-ups
(NOV2 or ζ=1, θ=0)

Taxi incumbents who do
not laterally diversify
(INC or ζ=0, θ=1)

TFPQ

This figure shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of taxi total factor productivity (TFPQ) in 1997
conditional on diversification (ζ) and entry status (θ). n = 560
** See Table 3 for regression output that compares the four means of these distributions
ALI = Diversified firm (ζ=1, θ=1); INC = Incumbent who did not diversify (ζ=0, θ=1); NOV1 = Taxi-only
start-up (ζ=0, θ=0); NOV2 = Diversified start-up (ζ=1, θ=0)
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Panel A – 1992 and 1997 cross sections of taxi and limousine data

TFPQ / multifactor TFP
Total revenue ($000)
Taxi revenue ($000)
Taxi + limo capital ($000)
Taxi capital ($000)
Total vehicles (taxi + limo)
Total taxis
Fleets with 2 taxis / vehicles
Fleets with 3-5 taxis / vehicles
Fleets with 6-10 taxis / vehicles
Fleets with 11-25 taxis / vehicles
Fleets with 26-50 taxis / vehicles
Fleets with >50 taxis / vehicles
Fleet owned taxis (share)
Focused incumbent
Taxi & limo diversifier
Focused start-up
Taxi & Limo start-up
Taxi firm exits after 1992
Future taxi to limo diversifier
Taxis in the county
Limos in the county
Limo market concentration (HHI)
County population (000)
County square miles
Sole proprietor
Partnership
Cooperative

(1)
Taxi only
1992 (n=1020)
Mean Std dev
0.00
0.70
511
1694
511
1694
185
874
185
874
18
61
18
61
0.32
0.47
0.21
0.41
0.17
0.38
0.15
0.36
0.07
0.25
0.08
0.27
0.83
0.37
0.99
0.38
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.34
0.47
0.26
0.43
270
534
145
276
0.04
0.12
1238
1152
723
1501
0.10
0.30
0.02
0.14
0.03
0.16

(2)
Taxi only
1997 (n=1106)
Mean Std dev
0.00
0.79
965
2491
595
2157
431
1342
227
1104
39
81
26
74
0.11
0.31
0.32
0.47
0.19
0.39
0.19
0.39
0.08
0.27
0.12
0.32
0.56
0.34
0.25
0.43
0.40
0.49
0.12
0.33
0.22
0.41
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
626
772
322
482
0.23
0.27
1231
1236
778
1534
0.12
0.33
0.02
0.15
0.02
0.13

(3)
Taxi & Limo
1997 (n=2341)
Mean Std dev
-0.01
0.95
650
2321
324
1524
349
1017
168
647
33
76
22
73
0.09
0.28
0.31
0.43
0.20
0.39
0.19
0.38
0.09
0.26
0.12
0.31
0.58
0.35
0.14
0.35
0.54
0.41
0.09
0.28
0.23
0.42
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
520
741
244
390
0.26
0.32
1123
1547
951
2056
0.14
0.35
0.03
0.17
0.01
0.11

Panel A columns (1) and (2) include all firms with SIC codes 4121 (taxicabs) or 4119 (limousines), taxi
revenue  $10K, at least 2 taxicabs, and at least 2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in either 1992 or 1997.
Panel A column (3) includes all firms with SIC codes 4121 (taxicabs) or 4119 (limousines), total (taxi +
limo) revenue  $10K, at least 2 vehicles (taxicabs + limousines), and at least 2 fleets (taxi + limo) in their
market (county) in 1997 Note that Census Bureau restrictions prohibit publication of minimum and
maximum variable values.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (continued)
Panel B – Balanced panel
n=560

TFPQ
Taxi revenue ($000)
Taxi capital ($000)
Total taxis
Fleets with 2 taxis
Fleets with 3-5 taxis
Fleets with 6-10 taxis
Fleets with 11-25 taxis
Fleets with 26-50 taxis
Fleets with >50 taxis
Fleet owned taxis (share)
Taxi to limo diversifier
Taxis in the county
Limos in the county
Limo market concentration. (HHI)
County population (000)
County square miles
Sole proprietor
Partnership
Cooperative

1992
Mean

Std dev

1997
Mean

Std dev

0.05
675
230
21
0.27
0.19
0.19
0.17
0.09
0.10
0.86
n/a
228
103
0.05
885
861
0.14
0.02
0.04

0.68
1900
930
63
0.44
0.39
0.39
0.38
0.29
0.30
0.33
n/a
480
228
0.13
1036
1642
0.35
0.13
0.19

0.11
849
319
33
0.09
0.22
0.20
0.21
0.10
0.17
0.63
0.54
472
221
0.32
985
878
0.14
0.02
0.04

0.80
2739
1294
79
0.29
0.42
0.40
0.40
0.30
0.38
0.36
0.50
673
414
0.36
1148
1714
0.35
0.15
0.19

Panel B includes all firms with SIC codes 4121 (taxicabs) or 4119 (limousines), taxi revenue  $10K, at
least 2 taxicabs, and at least 2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in both 1992 and 1997. Note that Census
Bureau restrictions prohibit publication of minimum and maximum variable values.

43

Table 2 Diversification and the productivity of taxi-specific assets
TFPQi1997 – TFPQi1992 = a + B1ζi + XicBc + ei
Dependent variable = Change in total factor productivity (ΔTFPQ)
(1a)
(1b)
(2a)
OLS
2SLS
OLS
Taxi to limo
diversifier (ζ)

-0.45 ***
(0.10)

-0.53 ***
(0.17)

(2b)
2SLS

-0.41 *** -0.46 **
(0.11)
(0.19)

Middle 1/3 of 1992
size ($Taxi K) distrib.

-0.08
(0.09)

-0.09
(0.09)

Largest 1/3 of 1992 size
size ($Taxi K) distrib.

0.15 *
(0.07)

0.13
(0.10)

Corporation

-0.06
(0.06)

-0.05
(0.07)

ΔCounty taxi
ownership rate-i

0.20 ***
0.20 ***
(0.07)
(0.07)

Δlog(taxis in
the county-i)

0.02
(0.03)

0.02
(0.03)

Δlog (limos in
the county-i)

-0.02
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.03)

Δlog (county pop.)

-0.20
(0.29)

-0.21
(0.28)

Constant

N
R2
1st stage summary statistics
F-statistic
t-statistic on IV
R2
N

0.30 ***
(0.07)
560
0.08

0.38 ***
(0.09)
560
n/a

32
-5.6
0.05
560

0.39 ***
0.42 ***
(0.11)
(0.15)
560
0.12

560
n/a

10
-5.3
0.12
560

Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level
Results in this table include all firms with SIC codes 412100 (taxicabs) or 411920 (limousines), taxi
revenue  $10K, ≥2 taxicabs, and ≥2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in both 1992 and 1997.
The excluded status category is incumbents who did not laterally diversify. The excluded size category is
the smallest 1/3 of the 1992 size distribution measured in terms of dollars of taxi capital.
The 2SLS estimates use IV = HHI index of lagged (1992) market (county) concentration of limos.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the instrument is not necessary at the 1%
level [χ2= 33 in column 2(b)]
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level

44

Table 3 Diversification and organizational rigidity
TFPi1997 = a + Xσθ(σi,θi)Bσθ+ XicBc + ei
Taxi-only
Dep. var. = total factor
productivity (TFPQ)

Pooled (Taxi and Limo)
Dep. var. = multi-factor
productivity (TFP)

Taxi to limo
diversifier

(1)
-0.66 ***
(0.09)

(2)
-0.61 ***
(0.08)

(3)
-0.84 ***
(0.08)

(4)
-0.85 ***
(0.08)

Taxi and
limo start-up

-0.67 ***
(0.08)

-0.62 ***
(0.07)

-0.84 ***
(0.05)

-0.79 ***
(0.04)

Taxi only
start-up

-0.23 **
(0.09)

-0.17 **
(0.08)

-0.26 ***
(0.08)

-0.18 **
(0.08)

Middle 1/3 of the „97
sz. ($Taxi K) distrib.

0.02
(0.10)

-0.01
(0.05)

Largest 1/3 of the „97
sz. ($Taxi K) distrib.

0.16 *
(0.09)

0.14 *
(0.08)

Corporation

0.16 *
(0.08)

0.21 ***
(0.04)

Log (total county
taxis-i)

0.07
(0.06)

0.07 *
(0.03)

Log (total county
limos-i)

-0.06
(0.05)

-0.03
(0.03)

Limousine SIC
indicator
Constant

N
R2
ΔIncumbent TFPQ
- ΔStart-up TFPQ

0.43 ***
(0.06)
1106
0.13
-0.21 **
(0.09)

0.12
(0.16)
1106
0.16
-0.17 **
(0.09)

0.11 **
(0.06)

0.09
(0.06)

0.33 ***
(0.05)

-0.04
(0.06)

2341
0.20
-0.26 **
(0.11)

2341
0.23
-0.23 **
(0.10)

Standard errors are robust and clustered at the market (county) level
The results in the “Taxi-only” regressions include all firms with SIC codes 412100 (taxicabs) or 411920
(limousines), taxi revenue $10K, ≥2 taxicabs, and ≥2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in either 1992 or
1997. The “Pooled” regressions include all firms with SIC codes 412100 (taxicabs) or 411920
(limousines), taxi + limo revenue  $10K, ≥2 vehicles, 2 fleets in their market in 1997.
The excluded status category is incumbents who did not laterally diversify. The excluded size category is
“smallest 1/3 of the 1997 size distribution measured in dollars of taxi capital.” (or taxi+limo capital)
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level

45

Appendix: Estimating the Costs of Organizational Rigidity

Let firm i‟s productivity be completely characterized by a function f that transforms two
parameters θ and ζ into output plus a noise term ε that has mean zero, where θ captures
whether the firm is a start-up or incumbent firm, and ζ captures whether the firm is a one
product firm or a two product firm:

TFPi = f(θ,ζ) + εi
θ=1 if it is an incumbent and zero otherwise
ζ=1 if the firm is a two product firm and zero otherwise.

No incumbent firms were two-product firms in the pre-period so that when TFP=f(1,1)
we hypothesize that there is an interaction effect between θ and ζ that captures the cost of
organizational change:

C(δ) = g(θ*ζ) > 0 when θ=1 and ζ=1 and is zero otherwise.

Therefore,

E[f(1,1)] = E[f(1,0)] + E[f(0,1)] – C(δ).

The second hypothesis assumes more experienced firms are more productive so that
E[f(1,0)] – E[f(0,0)]>0. I have confined the analysis to the case where increasing levels
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of firm scope leads to increased coordination costs so that by assumption E[f(0,1)] –
E[f(0,0)]<0.24 I therefore normalize E[f(0,0)]=0 without loss of generality.

I test the assumption (A1) that incumbents generally outperform start-ups by netting the
average productivity of one-product incumbents against one-product start-ups:

(i) E[f(1,0)] – E[f(0,0)] = V(θ=1).

Where V(θ=1) is the average value of being an incumbent. A1 predicts that V(θ=1)>0.

The gross effect of incumbency and change in firm scope can be computed by subtracting
the average productivity of two-product start-ups from the average productivity of lateral
diversifiers:

(ii) E[f(1,1)] – E[f(0,1)]
= [E[f(1,0) + E[f(0,1)] – C(δ)] – E[f(0,1)] = V(θ=1) – C(δ).

Netting equations (i) and (ii) recovers the cost of change in firm scope. The second
hypothesis predicts that C(δ)>0.

24

Note that if taxicabs and limousines are complementary with respect to output the bias would lead us to
reject the second hypothesis when we should not.
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